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ABSTRACT 
Giving registered organ donors priority on organ waiting lists, as has been implemented 
in Israel and Singapore, provides an incentive for registration and has the potential to 
increase the pool of deceased donor organs. However, the implementation of a priority 
rule might allow for loopholes — as is the case in Israel — in which an individual can 
register to receive priority but avoid ever being in a position to donate organs. We 
experimentally investigate how such a loophole affects donation and find that the 
majority of subjects use the loophole when available. The existence of a loophole 
completely eliminates the increase in donation generated by the priority rule. When 
information about loophole use is made public, subjects respond to others’ use of the 
loophole by withholding donation such that the priority system with a loophole generates 
fewer donations than an allocation system without priority. 
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I. Introduction 
There are currently over 120,000 people in the United States waiting for a life-
saving organ transplant, the majority of which come from deceased donors.1 But even 
though one deceased donor can save numerous lives and registering to be an organ donor 
is relatively easy (e.g. checking a box on a form at the state department of motor 
vehicles), only 43% of eligible Americans have registered (Donate Life America 2012). 
Understanding what motivates individuals to register as organ donors — and, 
more generally, what motivates individuals to privately provide public goods — is 
essential to model behavior and to implement successful policy.2 In introducing the 
concept of warm glow (Andreoni 1988, 1989, 1990), Jim Andreoni made the discipline 
recognize that forces beyond pure altruism (Becker 1974) influence public good 
provision. It is a tribute to Jim, to whom this special issue is dedicated, that we can think 
clearly about these forces and that we have a rich vocabulary to talk about the various 
motivations at play in the private provision of public goods. 
As in most complicated environments, many of these motivations are at play 
when an individual makes the decision to register as an organ donor. A deceased donor 
has the potential to save numerous lives, generating an altruistic motive for registration. 
Since deceased donation benefits others, individuals might get warm glow from the act of 
registering. Finally, individuals might be reciprocal and be motivated to register when 
others register as well. Even when taken together, however, these motivations have not 
generated enough deceased donations to halt the steady lengthening of organ transplant 
waiting lists. For example, the kidney waiting list has grown continuously over the past 
decade (see Table 1).3 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In 2012, nearly 80% of transplanted organs came from deceased donors (based on OPTN data 
accessed Nov. 9, 2013, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/). Deceased donors agree to make their 
organs available upon death and can provide multiple vital organs (i.e. kidneys, liver, heart, 
pancreas, lungs, and intestine) and other tissues (e.g. corneas, skin, heart valves, cartilage, bone, 
tendons, and ligaments) whereas living donors overwhelmingly donate one kidney.  
2 This is particularly true in the context of organ donation, for which federal legislation prohibits 
the use of monetary incentives (see Roth 1997). 
3 The kidney waiting list currently stands above 98,500, based on OPTN data accessed Nov. 9, 
2013 (http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp). The long waiting list for kidneys 
results in part from the ability for kidney dialysis to keep patients with kidney failure alive for 
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Table 1: U.S. Kidney Donors, Transplants, and Waiting List 
 
Deceased 
Donors 
Deceased 
Donor 
Transplants 
Living 
Donors 
All Wait 
List Patients 
New Wait 
List 
Additions 
2002 5,638 8,539 6,241 50,301 23,630 
2003 5,753 8,668 6,473 53,530 24,680 
2004 6,325 9,359 6,647 57,168 27,278 
2005 6,700 9,913 6,573 61,562 29,140 
2006 7,176 10,660 6,436 66,352 32,356 
2007 7,240 10,591 6,043 71,862 32,416 
2008 7,188 10,553 5,968 76,089 32,577 
2009 7,248 10,442 6,387 79,397 33,652 
2010 7,241 10,622 6,278 83,919 34,404 
2011 7,434 11,043 5,771 86,547 33,564 
2012 7,421 10,868 5,620 89,576 34,834 
The data is provided by OPTN as of Nov. 1, 2013. New Wait-list Additions counts patients 
(rather than registrants) to eliminate the problems of counting multiple times people who register 
in multiple centers. All Wait-list Patients also counts patients rather than registrants. All Wait-list 
Patients data through 2011 is from the 2008, 2009, and 2011 OPTN/SRTR Annual Reports, 2012 
is calculated using 2011 data and 2012 New Wait List Additions and Wait List Removals data. 
 
Since private provision has failed to generate enough deceased donor organs, 
policy makers are looking for other ways to motivate individuals to register as donors. 
While U.S. law prevents monetary incentives for organ donation, there are other ways to 
incent registration, one of which is to provide priority on organ donor waiting lists to 
those who previously registered as donors. Under the current U.S. organ allocation 
system, which is similar to the systems in most other nations, priority on waiting lists is 
given to those who have been waiting the longest or those with the most immediate 
medical need.4 Under a priority system, organ allocation would also depend on whether 
an individual previously registered as organ donor, with registered donors getting an 
organ more quickly than those who are not registered. This policy has been studied 
experimentally (Kessler and Roth 2012) and has been implemented in Singapore and, 
most recently, in Israel. In Israel, the policy appears to have increased the number of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
many years. No dialysis exists for other organs. Waiting lists for other organs are shorter in part 
because many patients on those lists die while waiting. 
4 The allocation rules vary by organ. In the United States, kidney allocation is primarily by 
waiting time while liver allocation is primarily by medical need. These policies are a function of 
feasible medical care: while kidney dialysis allows patients to survive for years without a kidney 
transplant, a patient whose liver fails will die very quickly without a liver transplant. 
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deceased donor organs and the organ donor registration rate, at least temporarily (Lavee 
et al. 2013), although the research into its effectiveness is ongoing.  
One concern with implementing priority for registered donors is the possibility 
that loopholes in the system would allow individuals to register and receive priority but 
avoid ever being in a position to donate their organs. For example, an organ allocation 
system could be gamed is if it allowed individuals to receive priority immediately upon 
registration, letting individuals wait until they needed an organ to register as a donor —
effectively giving them priority without requiring anything in return. Careful 
implementation of allocation rules can eliminate this scope for gaming. In Israel, 
individuals who did not register by April 1, 2012 only get priority three years after they 
join the registry. 
While the Israeli legislation mitigated this particular type of gaming, it introduced 
a different loophole in the organ allocation system. One of the reported motivations for 
implementing the priority allocation legislation in Israel was widespread concern over 
free riding by ultraorthodox religious groups. These groups generally do not recognize 
brain death (i.e. when the brain ceases to function) as a valid form of death and 
consequently oppose providing deceased donor organs.5 Members of these religious 
groups do not oppose receiving organs, however, even those recovered from brain dead 
donors. It has been argued that this group of explicit free riders — those who will accept 
organs but not provide them — is a major factor for the historically low rates of organ 
donation in Israel (Lavee et al. 2010, Lavee and Brock 2012). The priority allocation 
system was meant to minimize this free riding by rewarding registered donors and giving 
free riders lower priority on waiting lists.  
Nevertheless, the implementation of the Israeli priority legislation created a 
loophole that may allow this type of free riding to continue. The Israeli donor card gives 
a registrant the option to check a box requesting that a clergyman be consulted before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Most organ donation follows brain death, since the deceased patient can be left on a respirator, 
allowing the organs to be kept alive until they are recovered. Cardiac death (when there is an 
irreversible loss of circulation) requires fast action, on the order of a few minutes, for organ 
recovery to be possible. Data from the New England Organ Bank (NEOB) indicates that in New 
England recovery rates are much higher among potential donors who died from brain death than 
cardiac death. Recovery rates were about 20 percentage points higher for registered donors and 
about 15 percentage points higher for non-registered donors in 2010, 2011, and 2012. (Personal 
communication, Sean Fitzpatrick, NEOB.) 
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organ donation occurs (see Figure 1).6 An individual who wants priority but does not 
want to be a donor could check that box with the implicit or explicit understanding that 
his clergyman would refuse donation if the supposed “donor” were to die and be in a 
position to have his organs recovered.  
 
Figure 1: Donor Card in Israel 
 
Translated into English the card (emphasis and color in original) reads: 
With the hope that I may be of help to another, I hereby order and donate after my death: 
      () Any organ of my body that another my find of use to save his/her life. 
Or: () Kidney () Liver () Cornea () Heart () Skin () Lungs () Bones () Pancreas 
      [] As long as a clergyman chosen by my family will approve the donation after my death. 
 
Even without an explicit checkbox, there is still the potential for a loophole to be 
abused in the Israeli priority system. Signing the donor card in Israel is not binding, so 
next of kin are still asked about donation and can block the donation of a deceased who 
had signed a donor card (Lavee and Brock 2012).7 When next of kin make the final 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 During implementation, a number of people specifically advocated for this clergyman check-
box option to remain on the card — amid suspicion that it was motivated by religious groups who 
wanted to receive priority without having to donate (see http://www.haaretz.com/print-
edition/news/officials-new-donor-cards-will-reduce-organ-transplants-1.374566). 
7 This is also the case in the United States, where next of kin can refuse donation even if the 
deceased had previously joined a state registry (Glazier 2006). 
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donation decision or can block the donation of a registered donor, individuals can register 
as donors to receive priority but instruct their next of kin to prevent their organs from 
being donated upon death, creating a loophole even if one is not explicitly available. 
What is the potential effect of such a loophole on the efficacy of a priority 
allocation system? A loophole might eliminate the incentive to donate generated by the 
priority system, since individuals can register to get priority but take advantage of the 
loophole rather than donate. Additionally, however, the loophole might interact with 
individuals’ prosocial motivations for providing the public good. In particular, the 
loophole introduces a very explicit form of free riding in which free riders not only fail to 
donate but also abuse a system designed to reward contributors. This abuse could “poison 
the pool” and lead individuals who would have donated in the absence of priority to 
decide against donation in response to others taking advantage of the loophole. If a 
loophole poisons the pool, then introducing a priority system with a loophole might 
backfire and lead to fewer donors than the system without priority.  
In this study, we use a laboratory game modeled on the decision to register as an 
organ donor to investigate how the existence of a loophole in a priority allocation system 
affects behavior. It will be years before we have data on actual donations and actual 
loophole use in Israel, but here we are able to study the loophole, understand what 
consequences it can have, and anticipate its effects. Certainly, some hypotheses about 
organ donation can only be investigated by asking for real organ donor registrations (see 
Kessler and Roth 2013). However, a number of important aspects about the organ 
donation decision and the organ allocation system cannot be easily manipulated in 
practice but can be manipulated and studied in the laboratory. We can use the laboratory 
to study the incentive issues involved in organ donation, abstracted away from the 
important but complex sentiments associated with actual organs.8	   
In this paper, we replicate previous results from Kessler and Roth (2012) and find 
that a priority allocation system generates significantly higher organ donation rates, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In practice, the costs of registering as an organ donor are difficult to identify. Costs may include 
fears about differential medical care for registered organ donors, fears that organs will be 
removed at a time or in a manner that is inconsistent with religious beliefs, or simply discomfort 
from thinking about death. In the laboratory, we can (1) impose monetary costs to model (to some 
level of approximation) the costs faced by donors and (2) control those costs, for example by 
giving some potential donors low costs and others high costs. 
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increasing the number of organs recovered and overall efficiency.9 In addition, we find 
that providing a loophole that allows non-donors to get priority completely eliminates the 
incentive from priority. When a loophole is available, almost all non-donors take the 
loophole so that 96% of subjects have priority. 	  
We also find evidence that providing a loophole can poison the pool, inducing 
individuals who would have donated in the absence of a priority system to withhold 
donation when a loophole is available. This decrease in giving occurs primarily when 
individuals have information about how many people took advantage of the loophole. 
Investigating the dynamics of donation suggests that individuals withhold donation when 
they observe others take the loophole. Observing others take the loophole decreases 
donation even controlling for the number of individuals who donate, demonstrating that 
individuals respond to others taking the loophole both because those individuals are not 
donating and because they are choosing to take priority through the loophole rather than 
remaining in the non-donor priority class. 
The results of this study enter a rich literature on motivations for private provision 
of public goods. A closely related literature that is also in the medical donation domain 
focuses on blood donation and primarily investigates whether incentives for donation can 
cause a “crowding out” that might lead to less donation overall. This work has generally 
found that incentives increase donations without leading to a decrease in blood quality 
(see Mellstrom and Johannesson 2008; Lacetera and Macis 2010a,b; Lacetera, Macis and 
Slonim 2012).10 In our experiment, we also find that an incentive — in the form of 
priority — increases donation rates. In addition we find that decisions are influenced by 
the choices of other subjects to donate or to take the loophole, particularly when those 
choices are observable. This finding relates to a vast literature on social information and 
conditional cooperation in public goods games in which subjects have been shown to 
conform to the public good contributions of others (for laboratory results, see Keser and 
van Winden 2000; Fischbacher, Gachter and Fehr 2001; and Potters, Sefton and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The experimental parameters in this study are quite different from our earlier work, but the same 
pattern emerges. 
10 For evidence of crowding out in other contexts, see Titmuss (1970); Deci, Koestner and Ryan 
(1999); Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a,b); and Ariely, Bracha and Meier (2009). For theory see 
Benabou and Tirole (2006). 
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Vesterlund 2005; for field results in the context of charitable giving, see Frey and Meier 
2004 and Shang and Croson 2009).  
 
II. Experimental Design 
Subjects played a game modeled on the decision to register as an organ donor. In 
the experiment, registering as a donor led automatically to donation when possible and so 
we refer to registering in the experiment as “donating”. In the instructions to subjects, the 
experiment was described in abstract terms rather than in terms of organs. Subjects 
started each round with one “A unit” (representing a brain) and two “B units” 
(representing two kidneys).11 
Each round of the game, subjects were endowed with $6, an A unit, and two B 
units, and each subject received one of two health outcomes. Each subject either had B-
unit failure, in which case both B units failed and the subject needed a B unit to earn 
more money in the round, or had A-unit failure, in which case he did not earn any more 
money in the round. Each round, before observing his health outcome, each subject 
decided whether to pay a cost of donation that would make his B units available to others 
if he had A-unit failure. Subjects were randomly assigned the cost of donation (either 
$0.50 or $4.00, constant for a subject during the entire study) that they had to pay if they 
registered as a donor.12  
If a subject paid the cost of donation in a round and had A-unit failure in that 
round, then each of his B units were given to a subject with B-unit failure.13 Subjects 
played in a fixed group of 8 players and were told that 2 of the 8 subjects would be 
randomly selected to have A-unit failure in each round (and thus the probability of A-unit 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The design here is similar to the game in Kessler and Roth (2012) but with different parameters 
and a simpler, two-stage implementation. In the results section, we first confirm that we replicate 
the pattern of findings from Kessler and Roth (2012) that a priority allocation rule generates more 
donors and then present our new results investigating the loophole. 
12 Note that we are modeling the cost of organ donation as a cost of registering to be a donor 
rather than of having the organs recovered (i.e. removed). Deceased donation occurs after death, 
when we generally assume that utility flows stop and an individual no longer incurs costs or 
benefits. 
13 As noted above, subjects were always asked for their donation decision before they learned 
their health outcome. That is, they had to decide whether to pay the cost of donation before they 
knew whether they would have A-unit failure (in which case their B-units could be given to other 
subjects) or B-unit failure (in which case their B-units would be useless). 
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failure was 25%) and that the other 6 would have B-unit failure (and thus the probability 
of B-unit failure was 75%). In each round, 0, 2, or 4 B units were made available — 
depending on whether neither, one, or both subjects who ended up with A-unit failure 
paid the cost to register as a donor. Consequently, either 0, 2, or 4 of the six players with 
B-unit failure received a B unit in each round. 
Subjects with B-unit failure who received a B unit earned an additional $4.00 in 
the round. Subjects with A-unit failure and subjects with B-unit failure who did not 
receive a B unit from another player did not earn any additional money in the round.14 
Since there were always six subjects with B-unit failure, a subject who paid the cost of 
donation and had A-unit failure always provided B units to two other subjects. Those 
subjects each earned an additional $4.00 from receiving the B unit. Consequently, paying 
the cost of donation generated $2.00 in expectation for other subjects (i.e. with 25% 
probability paying the cost of donation generated a total of $8.00 in extra earnings for 
other subjects). 
The experimental design varied the organ allocation rules and the amount of 
information provided to subjects. There were three different allocation conditions and 
two different information conditions, generating six different treatments in a 3x2 design 
as shown in Table 2. We first describe the organ allocation conditions and then the 
information conditions.  
 
Table 2: The 3x2 Experimental Design 
3 x 2 
Design 
Organ Allocation Condition 
Control Priority Loophole 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
C
on
di
tio
n Low Control, Low Info Priority, Low Info Loophole, Low Info 
High  Control, High Info Priority, High Info Loophole, High Info 
 
The organ allocation conditions differed in how B units were allocated to subjects 
with B-unit failure. In the control condition, any available B units were assigned 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 These subjects had round earnings equal to their initial $6.00 minus their cost of donation (if 
paid). Subjects who received a B unit earned that amount plus $4.00. 
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randomly to the subjects with B-unit failure; all subjects with B-unit failure were equally 
likely to receive a B unit. The control condition models the first-come-first-
served waiting list system in the United States (with subjects arriving onto the waiting list 
in a random order and a limited number of organs available). In each round of the control 
condition, the subject was reminded of his cost of donation and then asked to choose 
between two options: “Yes, I want to donate my B units” or “No, I do not want to donate 
my B units”. 
In the priority condition, subjects who had paid the cost of donation, but ended up 
needing a B unit, received priority for available B units. Subjects who paid the cost of 
donation and had B-unit failure were in a priority group, and any available B units were 
first assigned randomly among subjects in the priority group; all subjects in the priority 
group were equally likely to receive a B unit. Only if all subjects in the priority group had 
received a B unit were any B units distributed to subjects who had not paid the cost of 
donation. In this case, any remaining B units were randomly assigned to subjects with B-
unit failure who did not pay the cost of donation; each of these subjects was equally 
likely to receive one of the remaining B units. This is a very extreme form of priority in 
that no subject without priority ever received a B unit unless all subjects with priority had 
received one. In each round of the priority condition, the subject was reminded of his cost 
of donation and then asked to choose between two options: “Yes, I want to donate my B 
units and receive priority for a B unit if I need one” or “No, I do not want to donate my B 
units”. 
In the loophole condition, B units were assigned as in the priority condition, but 
subjects could join the priority group either by paying the cost of donation or by asking to 
receive priority without paying the cost. In each round of the loophole condition, the 
subject was reminded about his cost of donation and then asked to choose between three 
options, the two options listed in the priority condition above and “No, I do not want to 
donate my B units, but I do want to receive priority for a B unit if I need one”. 
Throughout the paper, we refer to this last option as receiving priority by taking 
advantage of a loophole (or just “taking the loophole”). 
11 
	  
In addition to varying the organ allocation rule, the experiment also varied the 
information provided to subjects about the costs of donation and the decisions of other 
subjects in their group.  
In the low information condition, subjects only knew their own cost of donation 
(but not the costs of donation of the other members of their group) and they knew for 
each round whether they had B-unit failure and, if so, whether they received a B unit (but 
not the number of donors or the number of people who took the loophole in that round). 
The low information condition was meant to provide noisy feedback with regard to the 
number of registered donors and the number of people taking advantage of the loophole: 
subjects could only infer this information from their own experience of receiving (or not 
receiving) a B unit when they needed one.  
In the high information condition, subjects were also told the distribution of costs 
of donation of the other group members and (at the end of each round) how many group 
members paid the cost of donation, how many group members chose not to donate, and 
how many group members took advantage of the loophole (when it was available).  
The amount of information provided to agents about the priority system is a 
choice variable of a policy maker, and we suspected it might impact how the loophole 
affected behavior. The low information setting is meant to model an environment in 
which policy makers are opaque about the number of individuals who register and 
donate. The high information setting is meant to model an environment in which policy 
makers provide more information about the number of people who register and who take 
advantage of the loophole when it is available. 
Subjects stayed in the same information condition (either low information or high 
information) for the entire study but played in two different organ allocation conditions. 
Subjects were not told how many rounds of the game they would play, but after they 
played 15 rounds in one organ allocation condition they were informed that the rules of 
the game had changed. The rule changes were explained and then the group played 15 
more rounds in a different organ allocation condition. Each session had 16 subjects who 
played in one of two fixed groups of 8 subjects, and both groups in a session played in 
the same order of organ allocation conditions so instructions could be read aloud. 
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At the start of the session, subjects were told that one round from the study would 
be randomly selected for cash payment and that they would take home their earnings 
from that round. After all rounds had been played, subjects were informed of the round 
that had been randomly selected for cash payment and all subjects were paid their 
earnings from that round in cash along with a $10 show-up fee.  
A total of 608 subjects participated in one of 38 sessions run at the Wharton 
Behavioral Lab during the fall of 2012. Subjects were college students who participated 
for one hour and made decisions anonymously on computer terminals. Average earnings 
were $16.62 per subject, including a $10 show up fee. The experiment was conducted 
using z-Tree 3.2.8 (Fischbacher 2007). 
Since subjects started in one of the three organ allocation conditions and then 
switched to one of the other two, there are six possible organ allocation condition orders. 
Table 3 shows the number of sessions, groups, and subjects who participated in each 
order of the conditions under low information and under high information. 
 
Table 3: Number of Sessions, Groups, and Subjects in Each Condition Order 
 
  
Organ Allocation Condition Order 
Control, 
Priority 
Control, 
Loophole 
Priority, 
Control 
Priority, 
Loophole 
Loophole, 
Control 
Loophole, 
Priority 
Low 
Information 
4 sessions 
(8 groups, 
64 Ss) 
4 sessions 
(8 groups, 
64 Ss) 
3 sessions 
(6 groups, 
48 Ss)  
3 sessions 
(6 groups, 
48 Ss) 
3 sessions 
(6 groups, 
48 Ss) 
3 sessions 
(6 groups, 
48 Ss) 
High 
Information 
4 sessions 
(8 groups, 
64 Ss) 
3 sessions 
(6 groups, 
48 Ss) 
4 sessions 
(8 groups, 
64 Ss) 
2 sessions 
(4 groups, 
32 Ss) 
2 sessions 
(4 groups, 
32 Ss) 
3 sessions 
(6 groups, 
48 Ss) 
 
 
III. Experimental Results 
The main result of interest is whether subjects pay the cost of donation so that if 
they have A-unit failure their B units will be made available to others. Figure 2 displays, 
by round and condition, the percentage of subjects paying the cost of donation. The top 
panel, Panel A, displays the data from subjects playing in the low information conditions. 
The bottom panel, Panel B, displays the data from subjects playing in the high 
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information conditions. Notice that in each panel, the data lines are broken after round 
15. This gap indicates that different groups comprise the data in Rounds 1-15 and the data 
in Rounds 16-30 for each organ allocation condition. 
While the incentives and parameters in this experiment differ from our previous 
work (Kessler and Roth 2012), Figure 2 demonstrates that we replicate the finding that 
providing priority for registered donors leads to significantly higher rates of donation. 
Combining data from the high and low information conditions, the donation rate across 
all subjects is 69.3% in the priority condition and 40.9% in the control condition This 
28.4 percentage point difference represents a 70% increase in the donation rate. 
Table 4 presents linear probability model estimates of donation. Across all 
specifications, the coefficient on Priority is positive and significant, indicating that the 
priority rule increases the probability of donation over the control condition. Regressions 
(1) through (4) analyze data from the first 15 rounds, when subjects have only played in 
one organ allocation condition. These provide a clean between-subject estimate of the 
effect of our organ allocation conditions on behavior, before subjects have experienced 
multiple organ allocation conditions. Regressions (5) through (8) analyze data from all 30 
rounds together. Regressions (2) and (6) control for Info (indicating that data came from 
the high information conditions) and include interactions with Info. Regressions (3), (4), 
(7), and (8) look at effects in the low information condition or in the high information 
condition separately.  
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Figure 2: Probability of Donation by Treatment and Round 
 
 
 
 
Lines are broken after round 15 to indicate that different groups comprise the data for  
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Table 4: Organ Registration By Condition 
 
 Donation (0 or 1) in a Linear Probability Model (OLS) 
 First 15 Rounds All 30 Rounds 
 All Data Low Info 
Only 
High Info 
Only 
All Data Low Info 
Only 
High Info 
Only 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Priority 
 
0.288*** 0.262*** 0.262*** 0.312*** 0.291*** 0.312*** 0.310*** 0.271*** 
(0.031) (0.041) (0.041) (0.045) (0.020) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) 
Loophole 
 
-0.061* -0.024 -0.024 -0.106** -0.045** -0.017 -0.020 -0.077** 
(0.035) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.033) 
Info 
 
 0.020    0.020   
 (0.045)    (0.035)   
Info*Priority  0.050    -0.043   
 (0.061)    (0.040)   
Info*Loophole  -0.082    -0.061   
 (0.067)    (0.043)   
Cost 
 
-0.121*** 
(0.007) 
-0.121*** 
(0.007) 
-0.120*** 
(0.010) 
-0.123*** 
(0.010) 
-0.129*** 
(0.006) 
-0.129*** 
(0.006) 
-0.130*** 
(0.008) 
-0.127*** 
(0.009) 
         
Round Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Observations 9120 9120 4800 4320 18240 18240 9600 8640 
Clusters 76 76 40 36 76 76 40 36 
R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 
Robust standard errors clustered by group are in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1%. Priority 
and Loophole indicate organ allocation condition and test for differences from the control condition. Info is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the data is from the high information condition and interactions with Info test for differences between the low information condition 
and high information condition. Cost is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject has the high cost of donation (i.e. $4.00). Round 
dummies include a dummy for each round of the game. 
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Since two subjects from each group are randomly chosen to have A-unit failure, 
the higher donation rate in the priority condition increases the number of B-units made 
available and average earnings. Across all rounds and both information conditions, 
average round earnings are $6.87 under the priority rule as compared to $6.50 in the 
control condition (p<0.01, robust standard errors clustered at the group level). But while 
the priority condition has a positive average effect on these variables, it favors the low-
cost subjects (those who must pay $0.50 to donate) over the high-cost subjects (those 
who must pay $4.00 to donate). In the priority conditions, 85.5% of low-cost subjects 
donate and get priority while only 20.6% of high-cost subjects do so. Since many low-
cost subjects have priority and few high-cost subjects do, high-cost subjects are 
significantly less likely to receive B units. Round earnings for the low-cost subjects rise 
from $6.54 under control to $7.24 under priority while earnings for the high-cost subjects 
fall from $6.40 under control to $5.78 under priority (for both tests p<0.01, robust 
standard errors clustered at the group level). 
What is the effect of adding a loophole to the priority allocation rule? Figure 2 
shows that a loophole eliminates the increase in donation induced by priority. In Table 4, 
the Loophole coefficient has a negative sign for all specifications, indicating that 
donation rates in the loophole condition are at least directionally lower than in the control 
condition. In addition, the donation rates in the loophole condition are always statistically 
significantly lower than in the priority condition (tests of whether the coefficient on 
Priority is equal to the coefficient on Loophole are rejected with p<0.01 for all 
regressions).  
Why does the loophole lead to such a vast decrease in donation compared to the 
priority condition? First, the loophole completely undermines the incentive created by the 
priority rule. The only difference in incentives between the loophole condition and the 
control condition is that the loophole condition has a dominated option that allows a 
subject to be in a lower priority class (by choosing neither to donate nor take the 
loophole). If everyone donated or took the loophole, then all subjects would have priority 
and all subjects would have the same probability of receiving a B unit, an identical 
outcome to the control condition in which all subjects have the same probability of 
receiving a B unit. Outcomes in the loophole condition are quite close to this benchmark. 
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Averaging across high and low cost subjects and high and low information conditions of 
the loophole treatment, we see that subjects only choose the dominated option 4% of the 
time. Put another way, across all rounds in the loophole condition, 96% of subjects have 
priority.  
But while the incentives in the loophole condition are nearly the same as in the 
control condition, behavior is different. Donation rates are directionally, and sometimes 
significantly, lower in the loophole condition than in the control condition. The difference 
is statistically significant when pooling all the data in the experiment in regression (5) of 
Table 4: the coefficient on Loophole is negative and significant. Breaking down the data 
by information condition — as in regressions (3), (4), (7), and (8) of Table 4 — we see 
that this negative effect of the loophole is only directional for the low information 
condition but is statistically significant for the high information condition. Looking 
across all rounds in the high information condition in regression (8), subjects are 7.7 
percentage points less likely to donate in the loophole condition than in the control 
condition, representing an 18.5% decrease in donation.   
 
Result 1: When informed about the actions of others, subjects are less likely to 
donate in the loophole condition than in the control condition 
 
It is worth noting two facts about Result 1. First, it is clear from the regressions 
(3), (4), (7), and (8), which analyze the information conditions separately, that the 
negative effect of the loophole is coming primarily from the high information condition. 
However, when comparing loophole to control, we do not get a significant interaction 
between the information conditions. As can be seen in regressions (2) and (6) of Table 4, 
Info*Loophole is not statistically significantly less than 0 (in regression (2), p=0.227; in 
regression (6), p=0.160). One reason that we do not get a statistically significant 
interaction between information conditions is that even in the low information condition, 
the loophole generates directionally lower donation rates than in the control condition. As 
a consequence, when we combine all our data from both the low and high information 
conditions together, as in regression (5), we get a statistically significant negative 
coefficient on Loophole.  
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Second, the negative effect of the loophole appears to be driven primarily by 
decisions in the first 15 rounds. The first 15 rounds provide a cleaner test of the effect of 
the loophole since donation rates in the latter 15 rounds may be influenced by decisions 
made in a different organ allocation condition during the first 15 rounds. (When we 
investigate the dynamics underlying the negative impact of the loophole, we will see 
some differences between the first and second half of the experiment.) Consequently, our 
primary test between the control and loophole condition is based on data from the first 15 
rounds. Nevertheless, the negative effect of the loophole is not statistically significantly 
different in the latter 15 rounds from the first 15 rounds. In addition, the effect is still 
significant when including all 30 rounds together, and the added precision of our 
estimates from the extra data leads the p-values fall when we include all 30 rounds rather 
than just the first 15. 
Lower donation rates in the loophole condition than in the control condition 
indicate that subjects who would have donated in the absence of a priority allocation 
system choose not to donate when the system has a loophole. Why do these individuals 
choose not to donate in the presence of a loophole and why is the effect particularly 
strong in the high information condition? 
To answer these questions, we investigate the dynamics underlying donation 
behavior. Table 5 reports regressions testing how the previous decisions of other subjects 
affects donation and whether this relationship varies between the loophole and control 
conditions. It reports results from the high information condition in regressions (1) 
through (4) and from the low information condition in regressions (5) through (8). All 
regressions have fixed effects to control for a subject’s general proclivity to donate in an 
organ allocation condition. 
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Table 5: Donation in the Control and Loophole Conditions 
  Donation (0 or 1) in a Linear Probability Model (OLS) 
 High Information Only Low Information Only 
 First 15 Rounds All 30 Rounds First 15 Rounds All 30 Rounds 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Others Not Donatingt-1  -0.015 -0.006 -0.015 -0.009 -0.011 -0.010 -0.002 -0.002 
(0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) 
Others Not Donatingt-1*Loophole 
 
-0.023 -0.034** -0.020 -0.025** 0.023* 0.020 0.010 0.012 
(0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) 
         
Others Not Donatingt-2*Loophole dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Round*Loophole dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects (*Loophole if in both) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 2688 2496 5152 4784 3136 2912 6048 5616 
Clusters 24 24 36 36 28 28 40 40 
R-squared 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.60 
Robust standard errors clustered by group are in parentheses: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1%. Others Not 
Donatingt-1 is the number of other subjects who did not donate (either chose not to donate or chose to take the loophole) in the previous round. 
Loophole is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the data is from the loophole condition and interactions with Loophole test for differences between the 
loophole and control conditions. Others Not Donatingt-2*Loophole dummies indicate a dummy variable for each number of non-donors two 
periods ago, which might be different for the loophole and control conditions. Round*Loophole dummies include a dummy for each round of the 
game, which might be different for loophole and control conditions. Fixed Effects (*Loophole if in both) includes a dummy for each subject in 
each condition (i.e. for subjects who played in both the control and loophole conditions, we allow them to have a different fixed effect in each 
treatment, which is only relevant for a subset of subjects in the All 30 Rounds regressions). All regressions exclude round 1 (and round 16 if 
analyzing All 30 Rounds). When we control for Others Not Donatingt-2, we also exclude rounds 2 (and 17).  
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Table 5 shows that in the high information condition, subjects are more 
responsive in the loophole condition than in the control condition to previous round 
actions of other. The coefficeint Others Not Donatingt-1 reports the effect on donation of 
the number of free riders in the previous round (i.e. subjects who chose not to donate in 
the control condition and who chose not to donate or chose to take the loophole in the 
loophole condition). In regressions (1) through (4), Others Not Donatingt-1 is directionally 
negative, suggesting that subjects in the control condition are somewhat less likely to 
donate when more of their group members failed to donate in the previous round. In 
addition, Others Not Donatingt-1*Loophole is negative and (in some specifications) 
significant, demonstrating that subjects are more responsive to free riding in the loophole 
condition than in the control condition. 
As expected, we see no such pattern in the low information condition in which 
subjects do not actually observe the choices of others (instead they get a noisy signal of 
others’ choices by either receiving or not receiving a B unit when they need one). For the 
loophole condition, subjects’ responsiveness to the previous round actions of others is the 
sum of Others Not Donatingt-1 and Others Not Donatingt-1*Loophole. This is always 
significantly different from 0 in the high information regressions (p<0.01 for all tests) 
and never statistically different from 0 in the low information regressions (p>0.1 for all 
tests). 
 
Result 2: When informed, subjects in the loophole condition respond more than 
subjects in the control condition to the number of free riders in the previous round  
 
Why are subjects in the loophole condition more responsive to free riding? Since 
almost all subjects who free ride in the loophole condition do so by taking the loophole, it 
may be that subjects respond more negatively to others who take the loophole rather than 
who do not donate but do not take priority.  
Table 6 conducts this analysis by looking exclusively at the loophole condition 
and controlling for the number of other subjects who donated in the previous round. In 
regression (1) of Table 6, the coefficient Others took loopholet-1 is negative and 
significant, indicating that in the first 15 rounds of the game subjects are 6.8 percentage 
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points less likely to donate for each additional person who took the loophole rather than 
simply did not donate without taking priority. 
 
Table 6: Donation in the Loophole Condition 
 Donation (0 or 1) in a Linear 
Probability Model (OLS) 
 All Data Cost=$0.50 Cost=$4.00 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Others Took Loopholet-1  -0.068*** -0.071** -0.051 
(0.023) (0.025) (0.055) 
Others Took Loopholet-1*Late 0.076* 0.082* 0.044 
 (0.037) (0.045) (0.063) 
    
Others Donatedt-1*Late dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Round dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 2240 1680 560 
Subjects 160 120 40 
Clusters 20 20 20 
R-squared 0.51 0.49 0.42 
Robust standard errors clustered by group are in parentheses: * significant at 10%, 
** significant at 5%,  *** significant at 1%. Others Took Loopholet-1 is the 
number of other subjects who took the loophole in the previous round. Late is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the data is from the second half of the experiment, 
after subjects had already participated in one other organ allocation condition and 
interactions with Late test for differences between the first and second half of the 
experiment. Others Donatedt-1*Late dummies indicate a dummy variable for each 
number of other donors who contributed in the previous round, a dummy variable 
that might be different in the first and second half of the experiment. Therefore, 
these dummies absorb the direct effect of Others Donatedt-1 and are allowed to 
differ in the first and second half of the experiment. Round dummies include a 
dummy for each round of the game. All regressions exclude round 1 and round 16 
for which there is no previous round behavior to observe. 
 
Results from Table 6 also help to explain why the negative effect of the loophole 
is particularly strong in the first 15 rounds of the game. After subjects have had 
experience playing the game in another condition, they appear to become less sensitive to 
the effect of individuals taking the loohole in the previous round. In regressions (1) and 
(2), Others Took Loopholet-1*Late is positive, marginally significant, and a similar 
magnitude as Others Took Loopholet-1, indicating that there is no effect of more subjects 
taking the loophole in the second half of the experiment. 
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Result 3: In the first half of the experiment, subjects are less likely to donate when 
they see non-donors take the loophole rather than stay in the lower priority class 
 
The negative effect on donation associated with others taking the loophole in the 
previous round is driven primarily by the six members of each group who have low cost 
of donation (i.e. $0.50) as reported in regression (2). However we see the same pattern — 
just more muted — on subjects with a high cost of donation in regression (3). This is 
sensible given that the low-cost subjects are more likely to contribute than the high-cost 
subjects, and so for low-cost subjects we are more likely to observe a significant response 
in donation to the actions of others. 
 
IV. Discussion 
In our experiment, the introduction of a priority rule significantly increased the 
number of subjects who paid the cost to donate their B units. Adding a loophole to the 
priority rule, as is allowed in the implementation of the Israeli priority system, 
completely undermined the beneficial effect of priority. In addition, when information 
about donation and the use of the loophole was made public, the loophole condition led to 
even less donation than the control condition. 
 That the priority rule increases donation rates shows that we replicate results from 
Kessler and Roth (2012) with a different experimental set-up and parameters. In the 
control condition, the primary incentive to donate came from the fact that donating 
generated $2.00 in expected earnings for other subjects.16 Under a priority allocation rule, 
there is an additional incentive to donate in that subjects are more likely to receive a B 
unit worth $4.00 if they donate. In fact, given the monetary payoffs in the game, there is 
an equilibrium in which all low-cost subjects donate in a given round of the priority 
condition. (Assuming all other low-cost subjects donate, the expected benefit of having 
priority is $1.52, which is well above the $0.50 cost of donation faced by low-cost 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Since the game is played repeatedly with the same group, there may be strategic reasons to 
donate in a given round if it leads others to contribute in later rounds. 
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subjects.)17 Of course, there is always an equilibrium in which no one donates, since 
priority has no value to a single donor — he can never give a B unit to himself.  
As expected, the priority allocation rule increases the number of donors, which is 
accompanied by more B units being made available and higher earnings overall. In doing 
so, however, the priority rule harms high-cost subjects — who rarely donate and so are 
less likely to receive a B unit in the priority condition than in the control condition — 
while substantially improving outcomes for the low-cost subjects.  
One might think such inequality created by the policy is fair, for example since 
individuals with high costs of donation are much less likely to provide the public good by 
donating their B units, so it might make sense that they benefit less from the public good 
(see Lavee and Brock 2012). Alternatively, one might think that the inequality created by 
the policy is unfair or even unethical, for example if costs are a function of religious 
beliefs on the basis of which we do not want to discriminate.  
A policy maker who wants to mitigate the inequality created by a priority rule 
might imagine giving high-cost donors a way of receiving priority without paying their 
substantial costs of donation, for example with a loophole that allows high-cost donors to 
receive priority without donating. The check box on the Israeli organ donor card, which 
asks for a clergyman to be consulted before donation, may aim to serve the purpose of 
providing a loophole for individuals whose religious beliefs make organ donation 
particularly costly. However, if policy makers cannot perfectly infer the costs of donation 
(or if they are restricted from using a proxy like religion), loopholes may be available to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The calculation of the value of priority and the existence of the equilibrium is outlined here. To 
show this equilibrium exists, we assume that all other low-cost subjects donate and that neither of 
the high-cost subjects donate, and we ask whether the last low-cost subject wants to donate. With 
probability 0.25, that subject has A-unit failure and gets no benefit from priority. Conditional on 
having B-unit failure, there are three possible outcomes: (1) both A-unit failures are high-cost 
players, which occurs with probability (2/7*1/6) = 2/42, and generates no value from priority; (2) 
one A-unit failure is a low-cost subject, which occurs with probability (2*2/7*5/6) = 20/42, and 
generates a value from priority of $4*(2/5 – 0) = $1.60, since having priority puts the subject in 
the pool for 2 B units with the 4 other low-cost donors with B-unit failure; (3) both A-unit 
failures are low-cost donors, which occurs with probability (5/7*4/6) = 20/42, and generates 
value from priority of $4*(1 – 1/3) = $2.67, since having priority secures one of the four B units 
for sure rather than having a 1/3 chance of getting the last B unit in the non-priority pool. The 
total expected benefit to priority is 0.75*(2/42*$0 + 20/42*$1.60 + 20/42*$2.67) = $1.52. Notice 
that the high-cost players never donate in equilibrium, since their cost of donation is $4.00, while 
the benefit of getting a B unit is $4.00 and so the expected benefit of having priority is always 
less than $4.00. 
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everyone. While the box on the Israeli donor card may have been intended to satisfy 
religious groups, anyone can check it.  
What is the consequence of introducing a loophole option into the priority 
allocation rule? We find that if it a loophole is available, both those with low costs of 
donation and high costs of donation take advantage of the loophole — only 4% of actions 
in the loophole condition were subjects who chose neither to donate nor take the 
loophole. The ubiquitous use of the loophole among non-donors completely eliminated 
the gain from priority. In addition, when the loophole was available and individuals were 
provided with information about its use, donation levels were lower than in the control 
condition that did not have a priority system.  
In interpreting this experimental result, one might be concerned that the high 
information condition — in which subjects are informed of the number of individuals in 
each round who donated, the number who did not donate, and the number who took 
loophole — induces an experimenter demand effect. We have two responses to this 
concern. First, it does not seem obvious whether reporting the use of the loophole would 
be interpreted as the experimenter encouraging or discouraging its use. Second, if 
demand effect concerns are that by explicitly reporting use of the loophole we are 
discouraging potential donors from contributing (and doing so in a heavy handed way), 
we think this speaks exactly to one of the lessons of the paper. Namely, policy makers 
might want to suppress information about the use of the loophole to avoid equivalent 
demand effects in the real world.18 
Results from the high information condition suggest that one reason for this 
decrease in donation is that subjects withhold donation when they see others take 
advantage of the loophole. This response to the number of group members who take the 
loophole comes in part from a standard conditional cooperation motive (see, e.g. 
Fischbacher, Gachter and Fehr 2001) in which subjects are more likely to contribute to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In the case of Israel, the ultraorthodox religious groups that generally do not recognize brain 
death and consequently oppose providing deceased donor organs are very active living donors of 
kidneys. Policy makers might choose to report total living and deceased organ donation together 
rather than just deceased donation numbers, which reported alone might suggest loophole use. 
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public goods when others contribute.19 However, the use of a loophole in a priority organ 
allocation system is a special case in which subjects both free ride by not contributing 
and abuse a system designed to benefit contributors and punish free riders. We see that 
even controlling for the number of subjects who donated in the previous round, subjects 
are less likely to donate when they observe non-donors take the loophole rather than stay 
in the lower priority class (at least in the first 15 rounds of the experiment). 
 To take advantage of the loophole in the Israeli system requires an individual to 
sign a donor card to receive priority with the specific intention of having that donation 
revoked if ever in a position to donate. There are additional psychological costs that may 
arise by taking advantage of a loophole in this way, for example individuals may feel like 
they have made a promise (see Gneezy 2005; Charness and Dufwenberg 2006, 2010; 
Vanberg 2008) or agreed to a contract (see Kessler and Leider 2012) that they feel 
obligated to fulfill.20 By providing the loophole as a simple third option along with 
options to donate and not donate, we likely minimized these costs, although the 4% of 
actions in the loophole condition in which subjects neither donated nor took the loophole 
suggests at least some (minimal) reluctance to taking the loophole.21 
While this paper investigates priority allocation systems and how loopholes can 
undermine them, there are a number of other strategies that might be employed to 
increase the number of individuals who register as organ donors or donate an organ while 
alive. One approach is to change the way individuals are asked to register. Some have 
advocated a switch from an opt-in protocol, in which individuals check a box to register 
and leave it blank not to register, to a “mandated choice” or “active choice” protocol, in 
which individuals must choose between joining the registry or not joining the registry 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The argument in Lavee et al. (2010) suggests that organ donation rates in Israel have been 
historically low because of the presence of free riders, which also highlights a conditional 
cooperation motive. Notice that in our study there are also free riders in the control condition but 
donations fall further when a loophole is available. 
20 If these costs are larger than the benefit of being in the priority class, individuals may choose to 
forgo the loophole and simply not donate. 
21 Twenty percent of subjects who played in the loophole condition chose not to donate and not to 
take the loophole in at least one round. That said, among this 20%, the choice was selected on 
average only 3 times out of the 15 rounds. Only one subject out of 368 who played in the 
loophole condition chose not to donate and not to take the loophole in all 15 rounds. 
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(see Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Thaler 2009).22 Another approach is to facilitate kidney 
exchange, in which incompatible patient-donor pairs are matched. This process finds 
compatible patient-donor pairs where donor A gives a kidney to donor B’s patient while 
donor B gives a kidney to donor A’s patient (Roth, Sonmez and Unver 2004, 2005a,b, 
2007; Roth et al. 2006; Saidman et al. 2006).23  
 Results from our paper demonstrate that along with these other strategies, organ 
allocation policy may be a powerful tool to increase the number of deceased donor organs 
that are made available for transplantation, for example by providing priority on organ 
waiting lists for registered donors. But how such allocation rules are implemented can 
make a significant difference on their efficacy. Allowing loopholes in which individuals 
can receive priority without ever being in a position to donate can undermine the benefits 
of the priority system and could actually be worse than forgoing the priority allocation 
system all together. 
 While this paper has focused on the decision to register as an organ donor, we 
believe our results speak more broadly to other contexts. The pool of registered organ 
donors is like a common property resource since registering increases the pool of 
potential donors in expectation and thus benefits the entire pool of potential recipients. 
The priority rule we study here introduces excludability by giving preferential access to 
the resource to people who contribute. We find that allowing a loophole gives non-
contributors equal access, undermines the incentive effects of the priority system24 and 
leads potential donors to withhold contribution. This latter result arises when subjects 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This policy change has been implemented in Great Britain as well as a number of U.S. states, 
including Illinois and California (New York State just passed similar legislation). Recent 
research, however, suggests that changing the way individuals are asked to register can have a 
perverse effect on total donations, particularly from the next of kin of unregistered donors. In 
particular, individuals seem to treat the desire not to join the registry under mandated choice as 
more sacrosanct than failing to opt-in to the registry (Kessler and Roth 2013). 
23 New institutions have been formed to organize these exchanges and to create chains of 
donation that start with a single undirected donor (see Roth et al. 2006 and Ashlagi et al. 2011). 
As a consequence there have been over 2000 transplants due to kidney exchange since 2004 
according to data reported to the Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (see 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp). 
24 This result bears similarities to risk pooling systems with moral hazard (see, e.g. Fafchamps 
and Lund 2003) but with different timing and a one-shot structure where people can either 
contribute to the system or take from it. A priority rule helps to enforce risk pooling by forcing 
individuals who want the insurance of receiving an organ if they need one to commit to sharing 
their organs if they die first. The loophole introduces moral hazard into the system. 
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observe others take the loophole, suggesting that if a loophole cannot be avoided, then it 
may be prudent to avoid broadcasting its use. Planners that run club goods and excludible 
common property resources (e.g. membership-funded swimming pools, golf courses, 
parks, cultural institutions, and religious organizations) may want to avoid the creation of 
loopholes that allow access without membership. At the very least, they may not want to 
highlight when non-members take advantage of a loophole to use the facilities rather than 
paying their dues. 
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